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THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE ELIGIBILITY
RULE AND ANTITRUST LAW: ILLEGAL PROCEDURE
INTRODUCTION
Professional football's eligibility rule' has been a longstanding
tradition in the National Football League (NFL).2 The league rule
restricts participation in its player drafts to players who have attained
a college degree, have used up four years of college eligibility, or have
spent five years in school Various reasons have been offered for the
adoption of the rule. First, it is maintained that the rule was written
as an accommodation to the colleges and universities who feared that
without guidelines many players would leave school without degrees.'
The rule also accommodates the football programs of colleges and
universities by enabling schools to retain athletes for participation
in intercollegiate competition. Second, the rule benefits veteran pro-
fessional football players by providing them an opportunity to establish
seniority and job security before rookies enter the NFL.'
Despite its longstanding tradition and the reasons which
prompted its inception, the eligibility rule currently faces criticism
and attack' under the antitrust laws.7 The individuals dissatisfied with
the rule are college football players who have withdrawn from school
early, hoping to join the professional ranks. When refused admission
for failure to meet the eligibility requirement,8 some players have
threatened to retaliate by means of the legal process. In court, the
player maintains that the rule constitutes an unreasonable restraint
1. See NFL Constitution and By-Laws, Art. XII (1972). Though the United
States Football League (USFL) implements a comparable eligibility rule, that league's
practices are not considered here.
2. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1984, at 12, col. 1.
3. See supra note 1.
4. See supra note 2.
5. See SPORT, Jan., 1982, at 20, col. 2.
6. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 2, 1984, S 4, at 2, col. 1. One lawsuit challenging
the legality of the NFL rule is pending in Illinois District Court (Durrell v. USFL
and NFL). Moreover, former University of Georgia football player Herschel Walker
at one time considered contesting the NFL rule in court. He chose not to pursue a
legal battle and instead signed with the USFL's New Jersey Generals. The USFL
waived its version of the eligibility rule for him. See Underwood, Does Herschel Have
Georgia On His Mind?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 1, 1982, at 22-25. See also supra note 2.
7. It is undisputed that the NFL operates in interstate commerce. It is also
recognized that the business of professional football enjoys no special exemption from
the antitrust laws. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
8. See supra note 1.
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on his ability to market his services." Specifically, the player argues
that through the rule the league has effectuated a classic group
boycott."°
The group boycott" is premised upon the theory that a group
of competitors have attempted to prevent another competitor from
9. The provision of the Sherman Act that is pertinent to a challenge of the
eligibility rule provides in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. S
1 (1976).
10. There are two basic theories available to the player: the concerted refusal
to deal and the classic boycott. Each theory compels a specific result. A classic boycott
warrants application of the per se doctrine, which means that the activity is illegal
in and of itself. Thus, there is no opportunity for further inquiry. A concerted refusal
to deal, however, compels application of the Rule of Reason, which permits extensive
inquiry into the justification for the activity. See infra notes 191-97 and accompanying
text.
Spencer Haywood challenged the National Basketball Association's (NBA)
eligibility rule under a classic group boycott theory. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay vacated, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
The similarity of the rules and the success of Haywood's claim suggests that a player
challenging the NFL eligibility rule would pursue the same theory. It is contended,
however, that the Haywood case is of limited precedential value to the football in-
dustry. Differences in both the organizational and economic frameworks of the two
sports suggest that the theories must be applied with consideration given to the
peculiarities of the particular sport. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
738 (D.C. Cir. 1976), modified, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (recognizing that nature
of the NFL required concerted refusal to deal theory, rather than boycott theory).
It is too difficult to generalize about sports which have special goals, needs, and struc-
tures. For this reason, the focus of this note is limited to the case law that has developed
in the football industry. For an explanation of the nature of basketball, hockey and
baseball, respectively, see Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. 1049; Robertson v. National
Basketball Association, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.
1977); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351
F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). See also J. WEISTART
AND C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 477 (1979) for a good analysis of the various sports.
Moreover, the contention that the courts should tailor application of the tests to the
special nature of the football industry gains support from baseball's special treatment.
Baseball has been granted a special exemption from the antitrust laws. Flood, 407
U.S. 258. See Smith, 593 F.2d 1173 (court explained that boycott per se rule is not
appropriate in football industry).
11. Although some writers and judges use the group boycott and the con-
certed refusal to deal interchangeably, the concepts are actually different. A classic
boycott entails action by competing firms to inhibit the entry of potential competitors
by persuading another party from not dealing with the competitor. Such a boycott
constitutes a per se violation. With a concerted refusal to deal, however, the firms
themselves refuse to deal with the individual. Also, with the latter method, the party
to whom the concerted refusal is directed need not be a competitor. The concerted
refusal is not a per se violation. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
229-32 (1977).
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entering the market.12 Application of this theory requires that the
court pursue traditional antitrust analysis. 3 The problem with this
approach is that the antitrust laws were enacted to regulate and pro-
hibit business market, or commercial, restraints." Under the eligibility
rule, however, the league is not implementing a restriction that affects
either a competitor or the commercial market." The league does not
compete in any economic sense with the players; rather', the league
acts as the employer of the football players, who serve as employees.'6
Thus, the eligibility rule regulates competition among employees re-
garding wages, hours, and other terms or conditions of employment.'"
Accordingly, the rule is more properly categorized as a labor market
restriction.'8
Although the effect of a labor market restriction on price and
output may be as great as that of a business market restriction,
through labor policy Congress has chosen to sanction some labor
market restraints." Permissible labor market restrictions include hiring
12. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 30-44 and accompanying text.
14. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945)
(Court held that the electrical workers union's securing of closed shop agreements
with city electrical contractors violated the antitrust laws. Court noted that such an
activity restrained commercial competition, as opposed to labor market competition);
Smith, 593 F.2d at 1178-80 (acknowledging that product market restraints are a primary
concern of the antitrust laws); Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV.
1183 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Leslie]. Also of concern to the courts are restraints
that affect the labor policies of other employers in the industry. See United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (union-employer agreement to impose a
certain wage scale on other bargaining units violated the antitrust laws).
15. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. See also Allen Bradley, 325
U.S. 797 (indicating that courts should differentiate between product market and labor
market restrictions); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (a combination
of employees restraining competition in the sale of their services to an employer held
not a violation of the antitrust laws).
16. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1178-80; Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F.
Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). See also Kempf,
The Misapplication of Antitrust Law to Professional Sports League, 32 DEPAUL L. REV.
625 (1983).
17. "Wages, hours, and other terms or conditions of employment" are
designated mandatory subjects of bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). The parties to a collective bargaining agreement are bound to bargain over
such matters pursuant to labor law. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. S 158(d) (1976).
18. The NLRA, enacted in 1935, and the Labor Management Relations Act,
enacted in 1947, established the national policy in favor of collective bargaining. Pur-
suant to this policy, employees may combine in an effort to obtain desirable agreements
with employers regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. See D. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND POLICY 382-86
(1979) [hereinafter cited as CASES AND MATERIALS].
19. Leslie, supra note 14, at 1184. Labor market restrictions are restraints
1985]
Marencik: The National Football League Eligibility Rule and Antitrust Law:
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
732 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
halls" and strikes.2 The nonstatutory labor exemption doctrine' was
developed to enable courts to determine which restrictions are indeed
sanctioned by labor policy. The restrictions that fall within the ex-
emption are thereby granted immunity from antitrust attack. 3
Although the labor exemption doctrine should theoretically suffice as
the means by which the courts determine which restrictions deserve
antitrust immunity, the doctrine does not in fact fulfill its role in the
sports cases.' Misinterpretation and extensive judicial discretion have
subjected blatant labor market restraints to antitrust scrutiny.2 5
that affect concerted actions of employees. Professor Leslie explains that through a
union the workers can demand a wage rate higher than that set by the competitive
market. For this demand to be successful, the union must limit competition from poten-
tial replacements. By limiting replacements available to the employer, the union then
has the leverage to condition its members' continued work for the firm upon the
employer's agreement to employ no worker at less than the union wage. When a union
obtains such an agreement, it has monopolized the labor supply. This monopolization
results in a reduction in output and employment. Nevertheless, federal labor law per-
mits the monopolization of the labor supply. Antitrust laws, therefore, cannot prohibit
a union's monopolization of employees or wage bargaining. See A. CARTER. THEORY OF
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT 77-94 (1959) and Leslie, supra note 14, at 1185-88 for a more
detailed explanation of monopolization of the labor supply.
A business market restriction, on the other hand, affects firms competing for
a market share and the consumer who buys the product. For example, the group boycott
is characterized by one firm's inducement of a fellow competitor not to deal or have
business relations with an entering competitor. Such an agreement hinders the enter-
ing competitor's ability to compete in the market. Furthermore, the boycott ultimate-
ly harms the consumer, since he is prevented from deriving the benefit that competi-
tion among firms creates. The benefit may be a better product or a lower price. See
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). See also L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 11, at 229-57. Note that "product market," "business market," and "commercial
market" refer to the same market.
20. See generally Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) (agree-
ment whereby employers agree to hire only through union hiring halls, from which
skilled workers may be excluded, held legal).
21. Strikes are permissible restrictions by virtue of the interaction of two
statutes. See Clayton Act S 20, 29 U.S.C. S 52 (1970) (provides that actions of employees
terminating employment or ceasing to perform work do not violate the law); Norris-
LaGuardia Act S 1, 29 U.S.C. S 101 (1970) (denies federal courts the power to issue
injunctions against activities arising out of labor disputes). See also NLRA S 7, 29
U.S.C. S 157 (1976), which guarantees employees the right to participate in concerted
activities such as strikes.
22. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
Jewel Tea acknowledges that restrictions intimately linked to wages, hours, and work-
ing conditions and which have been instituted through bona fide, arm's-length bargaining
in a union's pursuit of its own labor policies deserve the protection of national labor
policy. Therefore, such restrictions are exempt from the Sherman Act. Id. at 702.
24. See infra notes 129-43 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 129-43 and accompanying text.
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The focus of this note is the operation of antitrust policy and
analysis in the context of the National Football League. Of particular
concern is the prospective treatment of the eligibility rule in light
of judicial interpretation in both football and traditional business cases.
An initial examination of the issues that arise in scrutinizing the an-
titrust implications of union-management activities indicates the in-
evitable confrontation of labor and antitrust policies. The discussion
then concentrates on the nonstatutory labor exemption's function to
accommodate the contrasting ideals expressed in the two polar sets
of laws. An examination of the courts' interpretation and application
of the exemption reveals that their approach prevents its proper func-
tioning, contravenes established labor principles, frustrates labor
policy, and ignores leading Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, the
flaws and implications of the current exemption analysis, coupled with
the inherent difficulties in applying traditional antitrust analysis to
the football industry, require the adoption of more workable guidelines.
ANTITRUST PERSPECTIVE
The basic policy of antitrust law is to promote and preserve free
and unfettered competition" by prohibiting improper restrictions on
economic competition.' Pursuant to this legislative direction, courts
have developed standards by which to analyze particular activities
or restrictions. The resulting tests have been somewhat unclear, even
in the context of traditional business situations. 8 Furthermore, the
26. See Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679; Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
27. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 803-06; Cf. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. 469. Legislative
history substantiates this basic policy of antitrust law. 51 CONG. REC. 13,663 (1914)
(remarks of Senator Ashurst).
28. The Court noted the difficulty in applying the antitrust tests in Profes-
sional Engineers: "[Riestraint is the very essence of every contract; read literally, S
1 would outlaw the entire body of contract law." 435 U.S. at 687. Justice Stevens
quoted Justice Brandeis' phrase: "Every agreement concerning trade, every regula-
tion of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence." Chicago Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See Note, Maricopa County and
the Problem of Per Se Characterization in Horizontal Price Fixing Cases, 18 VAL. U.L.
REV. 1006, 1033 [hereinafter cited as Maricopa County]. The author notes that Professional
Engineers provides a testimonial to the lack of clarity of the tests and the courts'
application of them. The author further notes that eminent antitrust authorities can-
not agree as to what mode of antitrust analysis was employed. See Maricopa County,
Id. at 1033 n.141, citing the following authorities: Sullivan and Wiley, Recent Antitrust
Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemption, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the
Rule of Reason, 27 UCLA L. REV. 265, 323 (1979) ("the Court applied the Rule of Reason
rather than the per se rule"); Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three
Proposals for Reducing the Chaos, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1593, 1594 (1980) (Court applied
per se rule in Professional Eng'rs.).
Another set of cases has also exhibited confusion. These cases involved unions'
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tests have become even less clear as courts have applied traditional
antitrust analysis to disputes arising in the sports industry.,
Modes of Antitrust Analysis
Critical to a court's scrutiny under the antitrust laws is whether
the per se doctrine or the Rule of Reason ought to govern its delibera-
tion. The Rule of Reason' is the more flexible mode of analysis
employed by courts. The test attempts to balance an activity's tenden-
cy to enhance competition against its tendency to injure competition. 1
If, on the balance, the agreement is found to have a net anticompetitive
effect, it is classified as an unreasonable restraint of trade in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.2 Historically, the Rule of Reason involved
only the rudimentary balancing of an activity's impact on competition
and permitted no consideration of the purported noncompetitive
justifications for the activity." Although it has been argued that the
potential liability under the antitrust laws. From these cases developed the nonstatutory
labor exemption, discussed fully later in the text. See infra text accompanying notes
97-100. See also Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers of Steamfitters Local 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975); Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676; Pennington, 381 U.S. 657; Allen Bradley, 325
U.S. 797; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. 469.
29. See Radovich, 352 U.S. 445; Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp.
73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979);
Smith, 593 F.2d 1173; Mackey, 543 F.2d 606.
30. Justice Brandeis' statement of the Rule of Reason in Chicago Bd. of Trade
is often cited to support use of this mode of antitrust analysis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought
to be attained are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
31. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 444 U.S.
1 (1979); Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 688-91; United States v. Columbia Steel
Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
32. Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 691.
33. See Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 691; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11,
at 229-32. This means that inquiry is limited to factors that reflect economic or com-
petitive effects, rather than factors that suggest non-economic or social policy con-
siderations. This view of the Rule of Reason limits inquiry to whether competition
was promoted or suppressed.
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rule should be limited to its historical application,,' courts increasing-
ly have allowed greater inquiry into the facts peculiar to the business,
the history of the activity, and the reasons for the activity." It is
this modern, flexible inquiry that makes the Rule of Reason attrac-
tive to litigants.
The per se doctrine, 6 on the other hand, is the more rigid test,
which reflects a court's lack of sympathy for a particular activity."
34. Professor Sullivan urges utilization of this type of Rule of Reason analysis
because it is an expedited approach to an inherently time-consuming test. See L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 229-32.
35. Both Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 691, and Chicago Bd. of Trade,
246 U.S. at 238, illustrate an acceptance of the listed factors as pertinent to Rule
of Reason analysis. A more liberal view maintains that the additional factors of social
policy and the interests of a particular industry also deserve consideration under a
Rule of Reason inquiry. This view is referred to as the elastic Rule of Reason. The
elastic rule would, therefore, enable an industry to argue that the special characteristics
of a particular industry warrant anticompetitive behavior. See Broadcast Music Inc.,
441 U.S. 1. Under scrutiny in Broadcast Music, was that composers had permitted
the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast
Music, Inc. (BMI) to issue licenses that gave subsequent users the legal right to per-
form the composers' products. In effect, this allowed ASCAP and BMI to issue blanket
licenses to television networks and other users. CBS alleged that the blanket license
was inherently anticompetitive, because it reduced competition among composers by
reducing their incentive to bargain individually with users of their products. Id. at
6. However, the Court rejected this contention. The Court acknowledged that without
the blanket licenses, each user would have to negotiate with individual copyright owners
every time a user desired to perform the owner's composition. Such a burdensome
process, however, would be destructive to the industry. Moreover, the costs associated
with individual negotiation and enforcement of copyright rights would also be detrimen-
tal to the industry. Id. at 20-22. Consequently, the Court reasoned that the agreement
proved beneficial to both buyers and sellers because it created substantial economic
efficiencies. Id. at 19-20. Broadcast Music exemplifies use of an elastic Rule of Reason,
which gives even more credence to the peculiarities of an industry than is sometimes
elucidated. Although the activity could have been characterized as a price-fixing
arrangement warranting condemnation under the per se rule, a flexible Rule of Reason
inquiry into the particular industry proved that the activity was desirable. It is con-
tended that even this approach is consistent with the general notion underlying Rule
of Reason; providing the opportunity for consideration of the peculiarities of the
business. See also Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments-1979, 80 COL. L. REV. 1,
16, 17 n.106, 18-19 (1980) (lobbying for a Rule of Reason which incorporates social con-
cerns); Maricopa County, supra note 28, at 1013-18.
36. "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their per-
nicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pacific Ry.,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See also Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (invoking a per se rule for boycott
practice).
37. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495
(1969); Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. 207; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
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The doctrine's operation illustrates its two underlying goals: avoiding
burdensome litigation88 that is unnecessary because of a court's
previous experience with an activity;89 and providing clear guidelines
for businesses, thereby enabling them to conform their practices with
the antitrust laws."0 Although often viewed as a harsh test, it has
been contended that the per se doctrine is actually a special form of
Rule of Reason analysis.' This view relies on the notion that courts
apply the per se rule of invalidity when previous experience with
similar situations'2 reveals that the conduct is recurringly and manifest-
ly anticompetitive."2 The rule has therefore been labeled a judicial
shortcut."
Theoretically, an activity declared illegal under per se analysis
should receive the same determination under Rule of Reason analysis."
This will occur if a court employs the traditional Rule of Reason
analysis.' However, if a court applies the elastic Rule of Reason, which
permits evidence of an activity's noncompetitive justifications and
allows more flexible inquiries into the activity, a different result is
likely to occur.' 7 Because courts are increasingly applying the elastic
(1947); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See also J.
WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 590-99.
38. See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972);
J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 590-99.
39. "[Ilt is only after considerable experience with certain business relation-
ships that courts classify them as per se violations." Topco Associates, 405 U.S. at 607.
40. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, Part I, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 832, 840-41 (1965).
41. See Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692; Standard Oil v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 196. The per se rule is viewed as a special
application of Rule of Reason analysis. Per se treatment reveals that a court can con-
fidently predict that Rule of Reason will condemn the activity. A court's confidence
in the ultimate illegality of particular restraints derives from previous judicial ex-
perience, characterized by consistent findings of antitrust violations. See infra notes
42-44 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (classic boycott subject to per se doc-
trine); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements
subject to per se doctrine); Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (price fixing subject to per
se doctrine).
43. See Northern Pacific Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
44. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1180; But see Continental Television Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) (per se rule not to be extended solely on basis
of judicial convenience and business certainty).
45. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1; J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10,
at 604; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 196.
46. See supra note 33.
47. As explained previously, the traditional Rule of Reason basically limits
inquiry to an activity's impact on competition. See supra note 33. When a court adopts
this approach, judicial interpretation is somewhat limited and decisions are more con-
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 [1985], Art. 5
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version, the decision between the per se doctrine and the Rule of
Reason is vital to a defendant's case.'"
Application of Antitrust Analysis to the Football Industry
In most of the recent antitrust litigation in professional football,
the subject of controversy has been the various mechanisms which
the NFL utilizes to control the influx of new players into the league
and to limit the movement of existing professional players.'9 Typical-
ly the restraints are characterized under traditional business theories
as either group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal. Litigation in
these cases involves the same controversy confronted in traditional
antitrust litigation: whether to use the per se doctrine or the Rule
of Reason.' The unique nature of the football industry initially made
sistent. This permits courts to indulge in predictions about outcomes of recurring situa-
tions and enables them to take advantage of the per se rule. Under this approach,
even though a court applies a per se rule, a Rule of Reason analysis should produce
the same holding of illegality. On the other hand, elastic Rule of Reason invites greater
judicial interpretation, increasing the likelihood that outcomes vary with the particular
judges and the particular facts. Thus, the flexibility in a court's scrutiny makes it
more difficult to generalize about future situations. Under this approach, a per se holding
and a Rule of Reason analysis can produce contrary results. See supra note 35. The
consequences of the two approaches are exhibited in the following situation. Price
fixing has long been recognized as an activity deserving of the application of the per
se rule. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150; United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S.
392, 398 (1927). However, in Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1, the Court decided that the
blanket licenses issued by ASCAP were not per se illegal even though they "literally"
fixed prices. It is important to note that the antitrust tests have developed and changed
through the years, as evidenced in the case law, and that for purposes of this note
explanation of the tests and their evolution is limited. For thorough discussions on
such matters, see Taylor, Rule of Reason Cases Since National Society of Professional
Engineers, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 185 (1982); Maricopa County, supra note 28, at 1006. See
also supra note 28.
48. Plaintiffs frequently argue for a per se label because the accompanying
conclusive presumption of illegality prevents the defendant from supplying any pro-
competitive justification for his actions. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. 207; Northern
Pacific Ry., 356 U.S. 1; Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150; Smith, 593 F.2d 1173; Mackey,
543 F.2d 606.
49. See, e.g., Smith, 593 F.2d 1173 (court examined draft system, which allows
the least successful clubs in the NFL to secure the best of the new talent). Kapp,
586 F.2d 644 (in addition to the draft, standard player contiract, and Rozelle Rule, court
examined the tampering rule, which granted a club with the exclusive rights to a
player, thus limiting the right of other clubs to compete for the athlete's services;
also subject to scrutiny was the option clause, which granted a club the right to renew
a contract with a rookie for one additional year); Mackey, 543 F.2d 606 (court scrutinized
the Rozelle Rule, which provided that any club signing a free agent must compensate
the original employer).
50. See, e.g., Smith, 593 F.2d 1173; Kapp, 586 F.2d 644; Mackey, 543 F.2d 606.
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courts reluctant to apply the per se rule;51 the individual teams that
comprise the NFL are not competitive in any economic sense, as com-
pared to businesses in the free market.2 Rather, the clubs maintain
a joint venture relationship in order to produce an entertainment pro-
duct: football games and telecasts. Even though the teams compete
athletically on the playing field, cooperation off of the field is
necessary." No NFL team would in fact benefit from forcing another
team out of business.' Thus, the free market model applicable in other
business contexts would be destructive if applied in the football
industry." Given the peculiar characteristics of the industry and the
51. See supra note 50. See also J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10,
at 600.
52. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1178-79; Mackey, 543 F.2d 606; Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154, 165-66 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 726 F.2d 1381,
1387 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984). (Due to the uniqueness of pro-
fessional football, the court refused to characterize NFL Rule 4.3, which regulates
the transfer of NFL franchises, as a per se violation). These cases recognized and describ-
ed the unique economic framework of the NFL. Contrary to popular belief, football
teams do not compete for telecast and ticket revenues. In fact, the League Commis-
sioner negotiates television contracts on behalf of all the teams. These monies are
distributed equally without regard to the size of the team's local television market.
Smith, 593 F.2d at 1179, 1199.
53. Judge Grim explained the framework of professional football three decades
ago in a landmark decision upholding an NFL rule that prohibited the televising of
one team's games into another team's locale when the latter team was playing at home:
Professional football is a unique type of business. Like other profes-
sional sports which are organized on a league basis it has problems which
no other business has. The ordinary business makes every effort to sell
as much of its product or services as it can. In the course of doing this
it may and often does put many of its competitors out of business. The
ordinary businessman is not troubled by the knowledge that he is doing
so well that his competitors are being driven out of business. Professional
teams in a league, however, must not compete too well with each other
in a business way. On the playing field, of course, they must compete
as hard as they can all the time. But it is not necessary and indeed it
is unwise for all the teams to compete as hard as they can against each
other in a business way. If all the teams should compete as hard as they
,can in a business way, the stronger teams would be likely to drive the
weaker ones into financial failure. If this should happen not only would
the weaker teams fail, but eventually the whole league, both the weaker
and the stronger teams, would fail, because without a league no team
can operate profitably.
United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
54. Id.; See also J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 595-96.
55. "... If one team goes out of business, all are endangered. This suggests
that the concept of business competition may be irrelevant as applied to the relation-
ships between members of a league." Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act,
15 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 211, 233 (1959). See also J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra
note 10, at 618.
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need for cooperation among teams, courts generally believe that the
league's justifications for its restraints deserve more consideration
than is available under the per se doctrine.'
Unfortunately, at one time courts applied the per se doctrine."
These decisions indicate confusion among the courts regarding the
interpretation of the doctrine's nature and purpose. Moreover, they
also create confusion and thwart the doctrine's subsidiary goal, which
is to provide clear guidelines that enable businesses to conform their
practices to the antitrust laws. 8 The case of Kapp v. National Foot-
ball League' is representative of this aberration. Judge Sweigert noted
many reasons in support of the proposition that a per se test is inap-
propriate for league sports activities. Sweigert nevertheless concluded
that the league's enforcement of the challenged practice "is so patently
unreasonable that there is no genuine issue for trial.""0 Thus, after
dispensing with the applicability of the doctrine in the situation,"' he
proceeded to discuss the activity as it would have been dealt with
under the per se approach.
Decisions following Kapp created a different anomaly. The later
courts did not determine which test was more appropriate. Instead,
they declared a restraint per se invalid and then applied Rule of
Reason analysis in the alternative. 2 Simultaneous utilization of both
the per se doctrine and the Rule of Reason frustrates the per se doc-
trine's primary goal and inherent appeal to the judiciary. Rather than
avoid burdensome and unnecessary litigation, the alternative procedure
fosters it. As indicated previously, application of the per se rule is
possible only after the courts have had considerable experience with
the particular restraint. The courts' experience with a restraint per-
mits them to determine whether or not a particular restraint par-
takes of an inherent anticompetitiveness that will consistently fail Rule
56. See Smith, 593 F.2d 1173; Mackey, 543 F.2d 606; Los Angeles Memorial Col-
iseum, 726 F.2d at 1387.
57. Smith, 420 F. Supp. 738; Mackey, 407 F. Supp. 1000.
58. See supra note 40, 41 and accompanying text.
59. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
60. Id. at 82.
61. In Kapp, the plaintiff alleged that he had been boycotted by the league
because he refused to sign a standard player contract. He further contended that the
operation of other league rules (such as the player draft, the option clause, the Rozelle
Rule, and the tampering rule) operated as unconscionable restraints upon his ability
to market his services among competing employers. Id.
62. See Smith, 420 F. Supp. 738; Mackey, 407 F. Supp. 1000. In both of these
cases, at the trial court level the judges applied the per se rule, but proceeded to
analyze the restraint pursuant to the Rule of Reason. Naturally, the courts reasoned
that the rules were likewise illegal under the latter analysis.
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of Reason analysis. In situations in which the restraints are consistent-
ly anticompetitive and deserve application of the per se rule, the courts
save judicial time by not having to pursue a lengthly Rule of Reason
analysis. Moreover, the per se rule gives businesses notice that the
judiciary views a particular restraint as a violation of antitrust law.
Utilization of both the per se rule and Rule of Reason, however, means
that the court has employed a lengthly analysis despite application
of the per se rule. Furthermore, when the per se rule is coupled with
Rule of Reason analysis, businesses have no reliable indication of what
the courts may do in future litigation. In fact, the procedure is likely
to confuse businesses. Mackey v. National Football League,3 the first
case to reach an appellate court, recognized the difficulty and rejected
the lower court's conclusion that a per se violation had occurred." The
appellate court explained that the unique relationship among the teams
within the NFL and the courts' lack of experience with the football
situations required greater inquiry into the justifications for the
challenged practices." The Mackey court had finally acknowledged that
the lack of experience with restraints and issues presented by the
football industry necessitated the extensive inquiry permitted by Rule
of Reason analysis."
Considering the unique nature of the football industry and the
direction of the per se-Rule of Reason debate in the football cases,
a court presented with the legality of the eligibility rule under the
Sherman Act should adopt Rule of Reason analysis. 7 Nonetheless,
balancing the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of a rule that
does not impact economic competitors is not consistent with the pur-
pose of antitrust law."8 The eligibility rule affects the competition of
63. 543 F.2d 606.
64. Id. at 619.
65. The Mackey court was the first appellate court to examine the joint ven-
ture relationship among the teams in the NFL. Id. The Smith court later examined
the same relationship in more detail. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1173.
66. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619.
67. The courts in Smith, Mackey, and Los Angeles Coliseum have indicated
that the unique composition of the football industry necessitates application of Rule
of Reason analysis. Smith, 593 F.2d 1173; Mackey, 543 F.2d 606; Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum, 468 F. Supp. 154. Pursuant to this direction, courts confronted with other
NFL restraints should also apply the analysis.
68. See supra notes 26, 30-32 and accompanying text. Antitrust law's aim is
to promote economic competition by prohibiting restraints that harm such competi-
tion; thus, it is inappropriate to apply antitrust laws to restraints that do not inhibit
economic competition. This argument is developed later in the text. See infra notes
102-16 and accompanying text. It is contended that the eligibility rule does not injure
economic competition.
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employees for wages, hours, and terms or conditions of employment,
which are central concerns of labor law." Antitrust law is relevant
only if the parties attempt to extend the influence of their collective
bargaining relationship beyond the immediate concerns of the employ-
ment relationship.0 The function of the labor exemption is to
distinguish challenged activities on the basis of the type of restraint
they impose.71 Theoretically, utilization of the exemption analysis
should indicate which restraints come within the purview of the anti-
trust laws and which are within the domain of the labor laws."2
LABOR EXEMPTION PERSPECTIVE
Historical Background
The labor exemption73 represents an accommodation between anti-
trust policy, which favors competition, ' and labor policy, which favors
organization of employees. This accommodation recognizes that union
69. See WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 129-31 (1968). Professor
Wellington explains that labor law recognizes that unions have a primary and substantial
interest in negotiating desirable agreements pertaining to wages, hours, and terms
or conditions of employment. These are matters about which unions, on behalf of their
members, have a direct and immediate concern. Professor Wellington further explains
that unions also have a substantial interest in the employment of new entrants because
they create an impact on these areas of concern. It is contended that the eligibility
rule qualifies as such a matter, since new entrants directly affect the terms and condi-
tions of the employment of existing employees. See also infra notes 136-39 and
accompanying text.
70. A review of the cases in which the Supreme Court has considered the
application of the antitrust laws in the labor area will confirm that the Court is primarily
concerned with product market effects of particular restraints (i.e., when parties ex-
tend the influence of their collective bargaining relationship beyond the immediate
concerns of the employment relationship). In Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. 797, the Court
condemned the union-management scheme which operated to prevent other manufac-
turers from selling their products in the affected areas. Likewise, the agreements in
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, and Connell, 421 U.S. 616, were aimed at the relative com-
petitive positions of outsiders. Moreover, in Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, the Court ex-
plained that when a restraint does not reduce competition among business competitors,
the Court will leave labor and management free to reach agreements pertaining to
the immediate employment policies of the parties.
71. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
73. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 17 (1976); Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. S 52 (1976); Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 104, 105, 113 (1976) (statutory sources); Connell, 421 U.S.
at 621-22; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (nonstatutory sources).
74. See generally Professional ENngineers, 435 U.S. 679; Northern Pacific Ry.,
356 U.S, 1; See also Jacobs and Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining:
Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).
75. The NLRA has established the national policy in favor of labor. NLRA,
29 U.S.C. SS 151-68 (1976).
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activity, though inherently anticompetitive, is desirable." Thus, the
purpose served by the exemption is to identify those restrictions
favored by labor policy and to immunize such restrictions from anti-
trust scrutiny." When the exemption is operative, it provides full
protection. 8
The labor exemption was first created by statute, which asserted
the general public policy in favor of collective activity by employees."9
Section 6 of the Clayton Act states that labor unions are not com-
binations in restraint of trade. 0 It further states that the antitrust
laws may not prevent the members of unions from effectuating the
legitimate goals of the organization." Because the Supreme Court's
limited interpretation of the Clayton Act left many union activities
vulnerable to antitrust attack," Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia
Act" to expand the reach of the exemption to other union activities."
76. See Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219; Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. 469. Unions are in-
herently anticompetitive because their very purpose is to eliminate competition among
employees, who constitute the labor market. It is generally assumed that such labor
market restraints are immunized. See Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition:
The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 17-30 (1963);
Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
659, 728-34 (1965).
77. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 625 (recognizing that federal "labor policy requires
tolerance for the lessened business competition" which results when unions attempt
to standardize wages and employment conditions).
78. The labor exemption is relevant when the restraint under scrutiny is the
result of a labor-management agreement. It is raised by one of the parties, whoever
is attempting to preclude antitrust attack. The exemption analysis, discussed later
in the text, occupies a place in the court's attempt to ultimately determine antitrust
liability. See text accompanying supra notes 98-100; J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra
note 10, at 525; Jacobs and Winter, supra note 74, at 1. If the court concludes that
the particular restraint passes labor exemption analysis, the restraint is wholly pro-
tected from antitrust attack.
79. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 17 (1976); 29 U.S.C. S 52 (1976).
80. 15 U.S.C. 5 17 (1976).
81. 15 U.S.C. S 17 provides that "labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed
to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof."
82. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). The
Court interpreted the Clayton Act as exempting only union activities which were
directed against the employees' immediate employers. Union efforts to boycott the
immediate employer's products while in the hands of other dealers and other secon-
dary activities were said to be still subject to the Sherman Act's prescription on
restraints of trade. Thus, the statutes were applied in a manner which limited the
types of economic power which a union could exercise in its effort to promote employee
interests. Id.
83. 29 U.S.C. S 104, 105, 113 (1976).
84. Together, the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act specifically
exempt certain union activities, such as secondary picketing and group boycotts, from
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Another aspect of the exemption is nonstatutory 5 The
nonstatutory exemption reflects a further attempt by the courts to
accommodate the conflicting policies of labor and antitrust law." The
source of the nonstatutory exemption is the strong labor policy which
favors the association of employees in order to eliminate competition
for wages and work conditions."
Since the formulation of the nonstatutory labor exemption,88 the
growth of the labor movement has required that the exemption assume
a broader function. 9 Initially, the exemption operated to protect only
the purview of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-22 (the activities
exempted were those unilaterally undertaken by a union in furtherance of its own
interests). See Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (union actions are not subject to judicial in-
terference "so long as the union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with
non-labor groups"). But see Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. 469 (the statutory exemption does
not protect concerted agreements between unions and non-labor groups).
85. See Connell, 421 U.S. 616; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676. The nonstatutory ex-
emption extends to certain union-employer agreements so long as the exemption's three
prong test is met. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
86. The Supreme Court has frequently confronted the interrelationship be-
tween the antitrust laws and the labor laws. First, the Court has noted that "benefits
to organized labor cannot be utilized as a cat's-paw to pull employers' chestnuts out
of the antitrust fires." United States v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturers Assn.,
336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949). See also Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 809 (union's arrangement
with those who supplied goods to or purchased products from the immediate employer
violated the antitrust laws). The Court, however, has also recognized that the very
nature of a collective bargaining agreement necessitates that the parties be able to
"restrain" trade to a greater degree than management could do unilaterally. See
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (a union strike, which was instituted to express disapproval
of the employer's selection of a competing union, did not violate the antitrust laws);
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (attempt by union and employer to affect the costs and markets
of competing employers violated antitrust laws).
87. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622:
The non-statutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy
favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages
and working conditions. Union success in organizing workers and stan-
dardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers,
but the goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if this effect
on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws.
Id.
88. The Supreme Court developed the nonstatutory exemption in recognition
that certain union-employer agreements must be accorded immunity from antitrust
sanctions. See Connell, 421 U.S. 616; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676. For an excellent discus-
sion of the nonstatutory exemption, especially its operation in sports cases, see Jacobs
and Winter, supra note 74, at 22-28; J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at
524-40.
89. In the first stages of the labor movement, the focus was on the union
and its important role. Eventually, labor laws developed a concern for the overall col-
lective bargaining process. See J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 527; CASES
AND MATERIALS, supra note 18, at 1-26.
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the union and certain types of its activities, particularly strikes and
boycotts." Thus, a union typically invoked the exemption to protect
demands and agreements made at the bargaining table from attack
by employers and outsiders." Increasingly, courts realized that the
doctrine actually protects the institution of collective bargaining, 2
rather than a particular party to the agreement. This philosophy
expanded the doctrine's reach and enabled both employers and unions
to invoke the exemption. Thus, employers also use the exemption to
preclude attack by employees disgruntled with the final collective
bargaining agreement.
Operation in Football Cases
In the sports area, the broader view of the nonstatutory labor
exemption is especially pertinent. Cases typically involve a situation
in which the league, comparable to an employer in a traditional
business scenario, invokes the labor exemption in an attempt to in-
sulate itself from antitrust attack.' Courts have permitted the league
to raise the exemption, in recognition of the doctrine's underlying goal
to protect the collective bargaining process.9 Again, when it is
90. See generally Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219; Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. 469.
91. See, e.g., Connell, 421 U.S. 616 (the union, whose members performed sub-
contracting work, alleged that its agreement with general contractors that they would
hire only subcontractors belonging to the union was protected from antitrust scrutiny);
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (union alleged that the union-employer agreement aimed at
another employer group was exempt from antitrust sanctions); Jewel Tea, 381 U.S 676
(meat cutters union urged that the bargaining agreement between itself and the various
meat retailers deserved protection from the antitrust laws).
92. See generally Pennington, 381 U.S. at 697-735 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in
part); Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 729-30 (opinion of Justice Goldberg) (Justice Goldberg stated
that in the case of mandatory subjects of bargaining, such topics should always prompt
the pre-eminence of labor law).
93. See, e.g., Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840 (1974):
We reject Scooper Dooper's contention that the labor exemption is
unavailable to employers. Such a proposition would undermine the vitality
of the exemption by discouraging bargaining on the part of management.
To preserve the integrity of the negotiating process, employers who
bargain in good faith must be entitled to claim the antitrust exemption.
Id, at 847 n.14.
94. See, e.g., Kapp, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979) (NFL argued that attack of the league's
draft system, Rozelle Rule, and standard player contract was precluded by the labor
exemption); Mackey, 543 F.2d 606 (NFL argued that labor exemption protected the
Rozelle Rule from antitrust scrutiny); Smith, 420 F. Supp. 733 (NFL urged the court
to apply the protection of the labor exemption to the draft system).
95. See supra note 94. "Since the basis of the nonstatutory exemption is the
national policy favoring collective bargaining, and since the exemption extends to
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operative, the exemption accords complete immunity from antitrust
attack, rendering further inquiry into the economic justifications for
the restraint unnecessary."
Nonstatutory labor exemption analysis progresses from two fun-
damental questions. The first question is whether the parties reached
an agreement about the particular rule, which they embodied in a
formal agreement. 7 The second, and more important, question is
whetherfederal labor policy deserves pre-eminence over federal anti-
trust policy, given the circumstances of the particular case." To answer
these questions, the courts invoke the nonstatutory labor exemption's
three prong test: 1) does the particular rule primarily affect only the
parties to the agreement, 2) is the rule a mandatory subject of collec-
tive bargaining, and 3) is the rule the product of bona fide, arm's length
negotiation." If these three points are answered in the affirmative,
the exemption is operative and labor policy deserves pre-eminence
over antitrust policy.' 0 The particular restraint is thereby immune
from antitrust attack. This analysis reflects that the courts' primary
concern is with external or product market effects of particular
restraints. ' ' Under the test, if a restraint does not primarily affect
only the immediate parties and if it is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining, there is a great likelihood that the restraint affects the
product market.'0 ' In such a case, a full blown antitrust analysis is
required to determine if the restraint produces actual anticompetitive
effects.' 3 However, in a situation in which the restraint does not
possess those defects, antitrust analysis is not required. Thus, the
agreements, the benefits of the exemption logically extend to both parties to the agree-
ment." Mackey, 543 F.2d at 612.
96. See supra note 78.
97. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 612. The nonstatutory labor exemption is rele-
vant in the first place because the restraint under scrutiny is included in a union-
employer agreement. Id.
98. Id. at 613 (citing Connell, 421 U.S. 616; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676; Penn-
ington, 381 U.S. 657).
99. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611-16; Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 741-44; Kapp, 390
F. Supp. at 86-87. For an application of the labor exemption in other sports, see Robert-
son, 556 F.2d 682; Philadelphia World Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462.
100. See supra note 99.
101. See supra notes 14 and 70.
102. See Connell, 421 U.S. 616 (union's demand that general contractors hire
only subcontractors who belong to the union condemned for extending the influence
of the agreement beyond the immediate parties); Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (union's
wage-scale agreement with an employer group other than its immediate employer con-
demned for being outside immediate employment-related concerns).
103. See supra notes 30-44 and accompanying text.
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test is tailored for sifting out cases that do not deserve antitrust
scrutiny"' by virtue of the fact that they do not promote the types
of activities about which the Sherman Act is concerned."°
The leading Supreme Court cases, which were developed in the
context of traditional business situations,06 further confirm that the
judiciary is concerned primarily with union-employer restraints that
affect the product market.0 7 These cases consistently distinguish be-
tween the product market and the labor market effects of particular
restraints. 18 United Mine Workers v. Pennington°9 and Allen Bradley
Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 81° are representative of the types
of impacts which concern the Court. In Pennington, the mine workers
union entered into an agreement with a multi-employer bargaining
unit comprised of large coal companies."' Under the agreement, the
union abandoned its previous rejection of the employer unit's attempt
to mechanize the industry in exchange for higher wages and other
benefits." Additionally, the union agreed to negotiate the same wage
scale from the smaller coal companies to insure that the large com-
panies were not disadvantaged by paying higher wages.' The Court
condemned the agreement for its attempt to affect the costs and
markets of companies not parties to the agreement;" therein existed
the defect.
The Court likewise condemned the arrangement in Allen Bradley
as violative of antitrust law."5 There, contractors and manufacturers
104. See Leslie, supra note 14, at 1223-24. Leslie indicates that the nonstatutory
labor exemption searches for potential restraints on competition, while substantive
antitrust analysis (i.e., per se and Rule of Reason) identifies actual restraints on com-
mercial competition.
105. See supra notes 14 and 15.
106. Connell, 421 U.S. 616 (construction industry); Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (meat
industry); Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (coal industry); Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. 797 (elec-
trical industry); Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (construction industry); Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S.
469 (industry involved in production of goods).
107. See supra note 70.
108. See supra note 70.
109. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
110. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
111. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 666: "ITihere is nothing in the labor policy in-
dicating that the union and the employers in one bargaining unit are free to bargain
about the wages, hours, and working conditions of other bargaining units or to attempt
to settle these matters for the entire industry."
115. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 809.
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monopolized all the business in New York City, barred all other
businessmen from the area, and charged the public prices far above
a competitive level."1 Specifically, the manufacturers of the electrical
equipment agreed to sell their product only to contractors who
employed union members."7 In return, the contractors agreed to buy
the equipment only from manufacturers who also employed union
members."8 Through this arrangement, the three groups boycotted
non-participating contractors and manufacturers."9 The Court agreed
with a non-participating manufacturer who challenged the activity, that
the group's activity had restrained commercial competition."'
The football cases do not involve the situations present in cases
such as Allen Bradley or Pennington.2 ' The complaining party is not
a business entity or a consumer, as he is in the leading cases. Rather,
the complaining party in football litigation is an existing or potential
employee who alleges that he has been injured by a particular
restraint.'" In Mackey v. National Football League,"' sixteen former
and existing players alleged that the league's Rozelle Rule' con-
stituted an unreasonable restraint on their ability to freely seek
employment. In applying the three prong nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion test,'' the court observed that the rule primarily affected only
the immediate parties since there was no impact upon competing
leagues or others outside the unit. 2 ' Moreover, the Rozelle Rule
qualified as a mandatory subject of bargaining" because it constituted




120. Id. at 801.
121. See supra note 49.
122. Football players are the employees of their respective teams. See, e.g.,
Smith, 593 F.2d 1173 (existing player brought suit); Kapp, 586 F.2d 644 (existing player
brought suit); Mackey, 543 F.2d 606 (existing player brought suit). An action challeng-
ing the eligibility rule would be initiated by a potential employee.
123. 543 F.2d 606 (1976).
124. The Rozelle Rule was named after football Commissioner Pete Rozelle,
due to the power vested in him to settle compensation disputes. Under the Rozelle
Rule, a team acquiring a player who had turned free agent must compensate the free
agent's former team. Compensation was in the form of cash, player contracts, or draft
choices. See Goldstein, Out'of Bounds Under the Sherman Act? Player Restraints in
Professional Team Sports, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 285, 288-89 (1977).
125. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
126. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.
127. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 5 158(d) (1976) defines a mandatory subject as "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
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a condition of employment." The results of the first and second prongs
of the exemption analysis indicate that the restraint primarily affected
the labor market, not the product market." Hence, the rule seemingly
did not deserve antitrust scrutiny.' The court held otherwise, how-
ever, upon determining that the rule failed the third prong of the
test. The court maintained that the rule was not the product of bona
fide, arm's length negotiation.
Application of the nonstatutory labor exemption analysis to the
eligibility rule' discloses that this rule likewise does not possess the
characteristics of a product market restraint. First, the eligibility rule
is a condition of employment and consequently a mandatory subject,"2
because incoming employees affect the terms and conditions of the
employment of existing employees."3 Second, the rule does not affect
outsiders under the meaning ascribed by Supreme Court precedent.'"
The third party here is not a business competitor or a consumer as
in Allen Bradley and Pennington;" instead, he is a potential employee.
Pursuant to established labor principles, a union may control outsiders'
access to employment opportunities within the relevant bargaining
128. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615. The Rule constituted a condition of employment
because by restricting a player's movement from one team to another, it depressed
player salaries.
129. See supra notes 70 and 102 and accompanying text. The NFL has in fact
maintained that restraints on player mobility actually benefit consumers (i.e., the fans)
who buy the product (i.e., the game) that is produced. By equalizing the playing
strengths among various league teams, the rules create more interesting athletic events.
The NFL further argues that elimination of the player restraints may prevent the
product from being offered altogether. The basis of this argument is that a league
with teams which continually dominate the games will not attract the fans. This, then,
would result in a loss of revenues and would endanger the financial stability of the
league. See H. DEMMERT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 31-39 (1973);
Canes, The Social Benefits of Restrictions on Team Quality, Government and the Sports
Business, 81 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
130. Antitrust law is primarily concerned with product market, or commer-
cial, restraints. See supra notes 14, 15, 70.
131. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 127.
133. See WELLINGTON, supra note 69, at 129-31. New employees (players) will com-
pete for jobs and wages with existing employees. The union has a substantial interest
in eliminating competition of this sort because it undermines job security. See also
C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAWS 726-56 (1971).
134. J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 553-55. The authors suggest
that despite an effect upon individuals who are not members of the bargaining unit,
the player restraints which control new entrants do not share the defects present
in Allen Bradley and Pennington. See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text. See
also Connell, 421 U.S. 616.
135. See supra notes 109-120 and accompanying text.
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unit." Thus, although the eligibility rule limits potential employees'
access to employers,'37 it does not inhibit the primary concern of anti-
trust law: commercial competition. 13 The rule instead encompasses in-
dividuals and issues controlled by labor law. 89
Despite the fact that a player restraint passes the first and
second prongs of the exemption analysis, as heretofore exemplified
with both the Rozelle Rule"" and the eligibility rule,"' the courts' ex-
isting interpretation of the third prong enables them to wield results
they deem desirable."" In considering the existence of bona fide arm's
length negotiation between the parties, the courts typically have re-
quired something more than bargaining.14 They require evidence of
extensive negotiations in which demands and proposals ultimately pro-
duce a final agreement about the restraint."' They refuse to exempt
terms which are the result of acquiescence to the status quo."' This
approach to the third prong vests courts with the broad, indiscriminate
power to deny operation of the exemption and to subject labor market
restraints such as the eligibility rule to antitrust scrutiny.
The courts' manipulation of the third prong of the nonstatutory
labor exemption analysis, through their strict insistence upon inten-
sive, arm's length bargaining, suggests that the courts are concerned
with more than ascertaining potential restraints on commercial com-
petition. First, the courts' approach suggests that they employ the
136. The view recognizes that a direct and unavoidable relationship exists be-
tween the hiring of new. people and the conditions under which existing employees
work. See Teamsters, 365 U.S. 667 (hiring halls, which base access to work on an
employee's duration in the trade and willingness to abide by hiring hall rules, are
permitted even though they restrain the ability of some employees to freely choose
their employers). See also C. MORRIS, supra note 133, at 712-15; Meltzer, supra note 76,
at 724-26.
137. The eligibility rule only limits access; it does not preclude access. A poten-
tial player may gain employment upon fulfilling the requirements. Moreover, even
though the superstar college football player claims to be disadvantaged by the rule,
one of the basic precepts of labor law is that the individual relinquishes his self-interest
in exchange for the benefits derived from collective action. See infra note 162 and
accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 14, 15, 70 and accompanying text.
139. Labor law is concerned with the organization of employees and the col-
lective bargaining process. See supra notes 18 and 75.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 123-128.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 131-138.
142. See, e.g., Mackey, 543 F.2d 606; Smith, 420 F. Supp. 738; Kapp, 390 F. Supp.
73. See also J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 582-84.
143. See, e.g., Mackey, 543 F.2d 606; Smith, 420 F. Supp. 738; Kapp, 390 F. Supp. 73.
144. See supra note 143.
145. See supra note 143.
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antitrust laws to pressure the football industry into improving and
developing its collective bargaining process."6 Apparently the courts
hope that a denial of labor exemption immunity will force the NFL
to address and solve the problems perceived by the courts, so that
the league can obtain antitrust immunity in future litigation. Second,
courts apparently use the antitrust laws to shift bargaining power
from one faction to another. 7 This shift naturally occurs when a court
declares that the labor exemption is inoperative and subsequently
holds that the particular restraint violates the antitrust laws. Labeling
the restraint a violation permits the players, through the National
Football League Players Association (NFLPA), to control the general
outcome of negotiations about the restraints.' Failure of the parties
to reach a satisfactory accommodation eliminates the particular
restraint from the collective bargaining agreement.'49 Conversely, had
the restraint not been declared illegal, the parties' failure to reach
a compromise would have resulted in the restraint's continued
existence."5 The courts have thus interpreted the labor exemption doc-
trine in a sufficiently indefinite manner and thereby provided a flexi-
ble framework through which to steer the football industry in the
direction they believe is desirable.
Promoting more effective collective bargaining is a desirable goal.
However, the method heretofore utilized by the courts in their at-
146. The recent origin of collective bargaining and the unique nature of labor-
management relations in the football industry have complicated the courts' third prong
analysis. The National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) was not established
until the late 1960s. This seems to disturb the courts. See Soar v. NFLPA, 438 F.
Supp. 337 (D.R.I. 1975), affid, 550 F.2d 1287 (1st Cir. 1977) (described development of
the NFLPA). Moreover, the NFLPA is comprised of all the players in the league and
negotiates with the National Football League Management Council (NFLMC), the
representative of all the team owners in the league. See also J. WEISTART AND C.
LOWELL, supra note 10, at 793-98.
147. For a discussion of the process of shifting bargaining power from one
faction to another, see J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 587-88.
148. Id. at 559 n. 482. The authors indicate that a previous court decision declar-
ing the Rozelle Rule violative of antitrust law impeded the 1975 NFL labor contract
negotiations. The NFLPA maintained that it could not consent to the Rozelle Rule
because the rule was illegal.
149. This assertion must be qualified. The employer does have the power to
invoke the theory of impasse bargaining. Under this theory, the employer can unilateral-
ly impose conditions proposed at the bargaining table if negotiations on the issue reach
an impasse. There are, however, many pragmatic reasons why an employer might not
choose to invoke the impasse theory. For example, the employer may want to avoid
antagonizing the union. See J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 587 n.627.
See generally C. MORRIS, supra note 133, at 330-31; Comment, Impasse in Collective
Bargaining, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 769 (1966).
150. J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 587.
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tempt to effectuate that aim offends the framework which Congress
established. Moreover, such an approach permits courts to subject
labor market restraints to an unnecessary antitrust analysis.151
RAMIFICATIONS OF EXISTING PROCEDURES
The courts' current approach to examining the existence of col-
lective bargaining between parties' when they pursue the third prong
of nonstatutory labor exemption analysis triggers the frustration of
a myriad of established policies. First, the courts' practice of evaluating
the content of the negotiations between the league and the NFLPA
undermines the basic principles of labor law policy.'" This practice
also circumvents the social policy which Congress chose to promote
through the implementation of those principles.'" These defects then
operate to prevent the nonstatutory exemption from properly accom-
modating antitrust and labor policies,'" which results in the improper
application of antitrust law to situations which were never intended
to come within the purview of the Sherman Act.' Ultimately, the
inappropriate application of antitrust principles generates additional
problems."7
Effects on Labor Policy
Three principles of labor law are particularly important. The basic
principle is freedom of contract in the union-employer bargaining
relationship.'" This tenet means that the parties are essentially free
to determine the content of their agreement;'" they are under no legal
obligation to satisfy any external standards of reasonableness or
appropriateness.'" The second principle of labor law is that each party
151. In light of prior textual discussions, such a result is contrary to antitrust
policy. See, e.g., supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 158-71 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
155. The proper accommodation of the policies would distinguish product and
labor market effects. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
156. Under the first and second prongs of exemption analysis, the Rozelle Rule
and the eligibility rule exemplify such situations. See supra notes 123-38 and accompa-
nying text. Other player restraints also exact the same conclusion under the two prongs
of the analysis. See, e.g., Smith, 420 F. Supp. 738.
157. See infra notes 189-212 and accompanying text.
158. See generally WELLINGTON, supra note 69, at 49-125; Jacobs and Winter,
supra note 74, at 10-13; J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 559-62.
159. But see WELLINGTON, supra note 69, at 49-90 (the parties, however, are
denied the right to decline to bargain); CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 18, at 367-90.
160. See WELLINGTON, supra note 69, at 56-59.
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has an obligation to bargain in good faith about issues pertaining to
wages, hours, and other terms or conditions of employment."' These
are matters about which a union has a direct and immediate interest
in light of its goal to improve employment security for present
employees. The third principle is that the individual employee loses
his freedom to deal with the employer in exchange for the strength
derived from collective action.'
The courts' substantive review of the football industry's bargain-
ing process during their exemption analysis, to determine whether
the NFLPA has received enough concessions, ' violates these three
labor law precepts. First, judicial intervention frustrates the parties'
rights to contract free from the imposition of outside standards.'" Out-
side intervention only complicates matters because the courts' lack
of familiarity with and sensitivity to the competing interests of the
parties renders them particularly unqualified to review the substance
of the collective bargaining agreements. 6 ' The parties themselves and
the established labor law mechanisms are better equipped for this
task.'" Next, by intervening to shift bargaining power from the league
to the NFLPA,67 the courts have distorted the second principle. That
principle requires only that the parties bargain in good faith'" about
161. See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. S 158(d) (1976). The Act also makes the failure by
either party to bargain in good faith an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. SS 158(a)(5)
(employer), 158(b)(3) (union) (1976).
162. The consequence of collective action is that the individual's desires are
subject to the will of the majority. This principle, although subversive of individual
freedom, is essential to the federal labor policy of encouraging unionism. See C. MOR-
RIS, supra note 133, at 304-07; Jacobs and Winter, supra note 74, at 7-10.
163. See, e.g., Smith, 593 F.2d 1173; Mackey, 543 F.2d 606.
164. See generally WELLINGTON, supra note 69, at 52-56 (outside influences create
disruption). See also NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-90 (1952)
(because there is no absolute standard for determining what constitutes reasonable
contract terms, courts would only complicate the bargaining process); Jacobs and Winter,
supra note 74, at 1.
165. See generally WELLINGTON, supra note 69, at 52-56; Jacobs and Winter, supra
note 74, at 1; J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 559-60.
166. Possible remedies under labor law are: unfair labor practice for failure
to bargain in good faith [NLRA, 29 U.S.C. SS 158(aX5) (employer), 158(bX3) (union) (1976)];
breach of union's duty of fair representation; [Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944)]. There will be no survey of the numerous issues and remedies
that could arise in this area. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this note. See
generally C. MORRIS, supra note 133, at 63-149; 18B T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW, ch. 10 (1973).
167. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
168. Good faith bargaining involves a willingness to enter into negotiations
with an open and fair mind and with a sincere desire to find a basis of agreement.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149
(1956); H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941). See generally J. WEISTART AND
C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 803-06.
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mandatory subjects. So long as the parties have satisfied the good
faith standard, no statutory provision or other legislative expression
justifies judicial interference.'69 Courts should not, pursuant to labor
policies, interfere to adjust the relative bargaining positions of the
parties or to assist a weak union."' Finally, the courts' approach even-
tually affects the third principle. Contrary to the notion expressed
in the third tenet, the NFLPA is precluded from achieving the
greatest interest for the majority of the employees because the courts'
intervention permits an individual to circumvent the desires of the
majority.'7' These desires are eluded by the substantive review and
condemnation of the parties' agreement.
In addition to violating the fundamental tenets of labor law,'72
the courts' approach further undermines the social policy sought to
be achieved through the observance and implementation of those
prescribed principles. The social policy that underlies the design of
the labor laws is finality in collective bargaining.'73 Not only is finality
a desirable policy which warrants encouragement, it is also the specific
policy mandated by Congress in its establishment of federal labor
law.'74 Finality is founded upon the belief that for collective bargain-
ing and the labor laws to work, the parties must have confidence in
the system.' 5 To achieve this confidence, the parties must be assured
that their final agreement will receive some deference. Congress has
chosen freedom of contract and non-intervention as the means to in-
169. See Jabobs and Winter, supra note 74, at 7-13.
170. See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952) ("The Board
may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment
upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements."); NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (1st Cir. 1953). See also WELLINGTON, supra note
69, at 57-60; J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 585-90.
171. This circumvention would transpire when agreements made for the benefit
of the majority operate as restrictions upon an individual. The NFL standard player
contract exemplifies such an agreement. Although the standard contract benefits the
majority of the players, who are of average talent, it restrains a player with extraor-
dinary talent. The superstar most likely could have negotiated an agreement more
favorable for himself. However, such a result is generally viewed as an unavoidable
ramification of the collective bargaining institution. See supra note 162.
172. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
173. J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 561. See Connell, 421 U.S. at
622; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664.
174. Cf. United parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1981) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (Stewart acknowledged the national interests in stable bargaining rela-
tionships and finality of private settlements). The entire body of federal statutory labor
law also supports this proposition. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-69
(1976); Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 141-97 (1976); Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 401-531 (1976).
175. See generally J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 560-61.
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still this confidence.' However, the courts' practice of manipulating
review of the parties' negotiations, which results in a denial of labor
exemption protection and consequent scrutiny under the antitrust
laws,'" undermines the goal of granting finality to the parties'
agreement. 78 The rationale is that one party is less likely to accept
the bargained-for result if the other party has access to judicial review
of the agreement's substantive terms.' 9 Such a result destroys the
collective bargaining process, since the parties are unlikely to under-
take a lengthy process that offers no security.
Effects on Antitrust Principles
The courts' frustration of labor law principles and social policy
ultimately prevents the exemption from properly ascertaining those
restraints which do not warrant antitrust scrutiny.'" Thus, the courts'
denial of labor exemption protection, through the manipulation of the
third prong, 8' culminates in an antitrust examination of a restraint
that is a mandatory subject and primarily affects only the immediate
parties.8 ' Moreover, application of antitrust law to these labor market
restraints exposes problems inherent in the application of antitrust
law to the football industy. 1' These problems emerge because: 1) in
light of the economic reality of the football industry," application of
business practice theories to the NFL contravenes the very nature
of the theories;'85 2) the courts do not accurately apply the business
176. Id. at 556-61. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
178. J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 561.
179. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 711-12 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part)
(Goldberg explained that requiring parties to negotiate and reach an agreement about
matters that are open to antitrust penalties "stultiffies]" the collective bargaining
process).
180. Antitrust scrutiny is appropriate for those restraints which affect the pro-
duct market. Because the player restraints (such as the Rozelle Rule or the eligibility
rule) affect the labor market, they do not share the defects which prompted the courts'
application of antitrust law in Allen Bradley and Pennington. See supra notes 106-35
and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
182. Both the Rozelle Rule and the eligibility rule constitute mandatory sub-
jects. Moreover, they both affect primarily the immediate parties. See supra notes
125-36 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 189-224 and accompanying text.
184. The economic reality is that the NFL constitutes a joint venture. Courts
have recognized this fact. See Larry v. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern P.A., etc., 670 F.2d
421, 429 n.11 (3d Cir. 1982); Smith, 593 F.2d at 1179; Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619.
See also supra notes 52-54. But see Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1387-90.
185. The practices which the courts apply in the football cases are the group
boycott and the concerted refusal to deal. See infra notes 188-204 and accompanying text.
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practice theories or the modes of antitrust analysis;1  and 3) the ap-
plication of antitrust law to labor market restraints yields distorted
results. '87
A fundamental problem develops during the course of antitrust
analysis in football cases when the courts attempt to classify a
restraint as a group boycott or as a concerted refusal to deal. " Com-
plications arise when courts use the terms interchangeably,'" because
the two theories represent distinct practices and compel the use of
different tests.'" The boycott or, more properly the classic boycott,
is an exclusionary practice by which competitors at one level attempt
to insulate themselves from competition from non-group members who
seek to compete at the level, by appealing to a third party not to
deal with the non-member. 9' This type of practice properly warrants
application of the per se doctrine; 92 consequently, courts refuse to
entertain evidence of the activity's reasonableness.'" A per se approach
is justified with the classic boycott because such an activity always
threatens competition, seldom offers any benefit, and often can be
achieved in less restrictive ways.19'
As with the group boycott, the concerted refusal to deal serves
as a means by which a group can exclude an individual. Conversely,
under the concerted refusal to deal, the group itself excludes the in-
dividual and the targeted individual is not necessarily a competitor
of the group."5 Many concerted refusals to deal lack the distinguishing
characteristics which invite application of the per se doctrine; one can-
not generalize that they always or almost always do substantial harm
to competition.'" Some concerted refusals may be harmful to competi-
186. See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
187. Distorted results transpire because two competing policies- antitrust and
labor-are directly confronting each other. See infra notes 219-25 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Smith, 593 F.2d 1173; Mackey, 543 F.2d 606.
189. See, e.g., Smith, 420 F. Supp. 738; Mackey, 407 F. Supp. 1000; Denver Rockets,
325 F. Supp. 1049. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 256-59.
190. See infra notes 192-202 and accompanying text.
191. Note that an important aspect of this concept is the effort of competitors
to exclude horizontal competitors. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1180 (citing L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 11, at 231-32). See also supra note 11.
192. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (in-
voking boycott per se rule where retailers induced manufacturers not to sell to com-
peting retailers); Fashion Originators' Guild v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (invoking
boycott per se rule where manufacturers induced retailers not to buy from competing
manufacturers).
193. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
194. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 240-41; see supra note 186.
195. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 229-41.
196. See Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th
Cir. 1977) (finding no per se illegal acti Mty in association's refusal to register plain-
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tion; however, others may not.19 Vertical restrictions,19 for example,
are widely used in the free market and have been supported for their
economic utility.'" Because concerted refusals are not designed to drive
out competitors, but to achieve some other goal,' they do not possess
the inherent defects to which the per se rule was meant to apply.201
These concerted activities are better analyzed under the Rule of
Reason."2 The failure of some courts, however, to distinguish between
the classic boycott and the concerted refusal fosters distorted results.'3
The use of the single concept "boycott" to cover agreements so varied
in nature results in the misapplication of the per se and Rule of Reason
tests.0'
The concern, therefore, is that in dealing with the eligibility rule
courts will fail to delineate the proper application of the per se doc-
trine and Rule of Reason analysis. There is merit to this concern,
because courts have previously misapplied the concepts in litigation
tiff's horse, in accordance with its regulation: "fi]n an industry which necessarily re-
quires some interdependence and cooperation, the per se rule should not be applied
indiscriminately"); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 256.
197. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 256.
198. Vertical restrictions involve situations in which, for example, firms at one
horizontal level impose restrictions upon firms at other horizontal levels, from which
the first firm buys or to which it sells. Such an activity is not designed to drive out
competitors; thus, the per se rule is not appropriate. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S.
36 (vertical restraint imposed upon T.V. retailer by T.V. manufacturer not illegal per se).
199. Id. at 57-58.
200. Id. See also E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual
Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 187-88 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) (finding
no per se illegal group boycott in airlines' refusal to list tour operator where tour
operator was not competitor of airlines and there was no intent to exclude him from
market); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bank-Americard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119,
124-25 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974) ("group boycott" label, with
consequent finding of per se illegality, properly restricted to (1) horizontal combina-
tions to exclude competitors; (2) vertical combinations to exclude competitors; (3) com-
binations designed to influence trade practices of boycott victims).
201. See supra note 36.
202. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-58; Worthen Bank and Trust Co, 485
F.2d at 124-25; McQuade Tours, 467 F:2d at 187-88; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 232.
203. A result contemplated is a court's determination that a restraint is a per
se illegal boycott when in fact the restraint does not possess the elements which
characterize a boycott. See, e.g., Smith, 420 F. Supp. 738; Mackey, 407 F. Supp. 1000.
The appellate courts did correct the district courts' errors. See Smith, 593 F.2d 1173;
Mackey, 543 F.2d 606.
204. See, e.g., United States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
Professor Sullivan notes that this case has been improperly categorized as a boycott
decision. The categorization is inaccurate because the facts did not involve an effort
to inhibit entry. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 257.
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involving the football industry. In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,"'5 the
trial court declared that the draft, 0 as a group boycott, constituted
a per se violation of the antitrust laws."7 The appellate court recog-
nized the error in the trial court's analysis0 8 and clarified the confu-
sion by distinguishing between a classic group boycott and other con-
certed refusals to deal. 9 The court noted that two factors distinguish
the NFL activity from the classic group boycott." ' First, the NFL
teams are not competitors in any economic sense."' Second, the NFL
teams did not combine to exclude competitors or potential competitors
from their level of the market. ' Rather, the individuals against whom
the restraint was directed were potential employees of the league.
The Smith court seemingly resolved the classic boycott, concerted
refusal to deal dichotomy in the football controversies."3 Accordingly,
205. 420 F. Supp. 738, modified, 593 F.2d 1173.
206. The draft is the NFL's player selection system by which the negotiating
rights to graduating football players are allocated each year among the NFL teams
in inverse order of the teams' standings. Once a team drafts a player, its right to
contract with him is exclusive and perpetual. See Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 744-45. See
also J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 257, 504-05; Pierce, Organized Profes-
sional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 43 CORNELL L. REV. 566, 602 (1958).
207. Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 744. The draft is an "outright, undisguised refusal
to deal [which] constitutes a group boycott in its classic and most pernicious form,
a device which has long been condemned as a per se violation of the antitrust laws." Id.
208. Smith, 593 F.2d 1173.
209. Id. at 1178-80.
210. Id. at 1178-79.
211. Id. The characteristics of the NFL substantiate that the NFL teams are
not economically competitive, For example, visiting teams receive forty percent of
gate receipts. See NFL Constitution and By-Laws, Art. XII, S 19.1 (1976 and Supp.
1982). If the football games, hypothetically, lost their appeal to fans, due to the economic
failure of a few teams, the adverse consequences would be felt league-wide. Ticket
sales and television revenues, shared among the teams, would threaten the existence
of them all. Thus, it would be irrational for the NFL teams to even attempt to com-
pete economically to drive one another out of business. The importance of the economic
interdependence of league members is reflected in the statement of the NFL Raiders'
owner Al Davis. He stated that the Buffalo Bills' owner had invested extensively in
the Raiders throughout the 1960s to help maintain the team financially because "[hie
wanted to promote his franchise, the Buffalo Bills .. .He needed opponents on the
field." See Kempf, supra note 16, at 630-32 (citing to Second Liability Record, Vol.
25, at 5347).
212. A football player is not a competitor of the NFL teams, Rather, he is
a competitor of the teams' employees, with whom he competes for employment. The
NFL's competitor, although not relevant in this situation, is the USFL.
213. The same situation had occurred with the Mackey trial and appellate courts.
The trial court found that the player restraint was a group boycott and thereby con-
stituted a per se violation of antitrust law. The appellate court corrected the lower
court's decision by determining that the activity constituted a concerted refusal to
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a court reviewing the eligibility rule should recognize that applica-
tion of the classic boycott theory 14 to the eligibility rule is inap-
propriate. The eligibility rule, like the draft, is implemented by the
NFL and pertains to new entrants. The NFL teams are not economic
competitors among themselves and the college players are not com-
petitors of the teams in the league. 1 ' Because the eligibility rule con-
stitutes concerted action other than a classic group boycott, the Rule
of Reason test ought to govern. The complexity and uncertainty of
the issues involved with the antitrust laws,"" however, offers little
assurance that future courts will properly apply the two theories. 17
Even assuming that a court properly administers the boycott and
concerted refusal to deal theories and concludes that the Rule of
Reason is the more appropriate test, another problem remains. This
problem adheres because Rule of Reason analysis, despite its tolerance
of exhaustive inquiries into the purported justifications for a restraint,
enhances the paradox which application of antitrust law to labor
market restraints instigates."' Distorted results ensue because Rule
of Reason analysis, by definition, prohibits agreements that do not
produce net competitive efficiencies."9 Concededly, the eligibility rule
produces a net anticompetitive effect because the very purpose of the
rule is to limit competition among employees for employment, by delay-
ing the entry of college football players into the league.22 ° Thus, a
court examining the eligibility rule under the Rule of Reason is likely
to conclude that the rule operates to restrain competition in violation
deal, rather than a group boycott. With this determination, the court then examined
the player restraint pursuant to Rule of Reason analysis and ultimately held that the
restraint violated antitrust law. Mackey, 543 F.2d 606. See supra text accompanying
notes 63-66.
214. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 51-54
and accompanying text.
216. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 259.
217. In fact, U.S. District Judge Laughlin Walters, sitting in Los Angeles, has
ruled that the USFL eligibility rule, which is similar to the NFL eligibility rule, con-
stitutes a "group boycott." Boris v. USFL, CV 83 4980 (1984). Although the NFL was
not a party to this particular case, the ruling, if not overruled on appeal, would be
a dangerous precedent.
218. The inappropriate application of antitrust law transpires when the labor
exemption does not perform its function. In the football cases, the courts have inter-
preted the exemption in a manner which precludes the doctrine's proper functioning.
See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
220. In Smith, the draft system failed the Rule of Reason test, because "its
purpose and effect is to suppress competition." Smith, 593 F.2d at 1185. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the competition suppressed was that among employees.
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of the Sherman Act.12 ' The irony, though, is that the eligibility rule
is exemplary of a union's success in securing a favorable agreement
for its members.' The eligibility rule regulates the influx of new
employees, football players, into the league.122 New employees in-
evitably create a direct impact on the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of existing employees.' Because unions typically strive to
negotiate desirable agreements pertaining to wages, hours, and terms
or conditions of employment, a union has a substantial interest in the
employment of these new employees. 5 Thus, the eligibility rule
achieves the protection of the employees in the bargaining unit, con-
sistent with labor law policy." That the eligibility rule would fail
substantive antitrust scrutiny, even though it constitutes a mere labor
market restraint, suggests that there is a flaw in the courts' present
approach to scrutinizing NFL player restraint mechanisms.227 This in-
apposite result ensues because the very purpose of labor law is to
eliminate competition among employees for wages and work
conditions.' In direct contrast, antitrust law encourages competition.'
The confrontation of the two sets of laws-antitrust and labor-in
this manner will systematically produce undesirable results.
As indicated, application of Rule of Reason means that almost
all labor restraints enacted pursuant to a union-employer agreement
would violate the antitrust laws.22 ' This result, however, offends the
policy established by labor law'"' and unnecessarily subjects accep-
table labor market restraints to an unsuitable antitrust analysis. The
deficiencies in the nonstatutory labor exemption and antitrust analyses
suggest that alternative guidelines are necessary. Alterations in the
courts' current exemption analysis and the adoption of a more flexi-
ble approach to Rule of Reason analysis will better effectuate the
221. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
222. See Leslie, supra note 14, at 1223. Unions usually do not produce net effi-
ciencies because they are inherently anticompetitive. See supra note 76.
223. See text accompanying supra notes 1-3.
224. See supra notes 69 and 133-36.
225. See supra notes 69 and 133-36.
226. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text. Such a result is contrary
to the true policy and concerns of antitrust law. Antitrust law is concerned with
restraints that affect commercial competition (i.e., the product market). See supra notes
14, 15, 68, 70.
228. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
230. See Leslie, supra note 14, at 1223; J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note
10, at 541-61.
231. See supra note 18.
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policies embodied in these two polar sets of laws when applied to
the football industry.
THE NECESSITY FOR ALTERNATIVE GUIDELINES: A PROPOSAL
To apply any law so that it is useful to other courts and similar-
ly situated parties, there must be definite guidelines. In the case of
antitrust law, neither the antitrust analysis nor the nonstatutory labor
exemption analysis are cogent. Since the courts' current interpreta-
tions foster confusion, promote distorted results, and violate
established policies, revisions are imperative.
The current application of the nonstatutory labor exemption
enables courts to circumvent the function of the exemption"' and to
subject player restraint mechanisms to inappropriate antitrust
scrutiny."'3 The courts' interpretations of the first and second prongs
have not generated the ambiguities and confusion. The courts have
been consistent in their interpretations of which matters constitute
mandatory subjects and which restraints primarily involve only the
immediate parties." However, the courts' application of the third
prong has enabled them to frustrate labor policies 3' and to subject
otherwise acceptable labor market restraintsm to the antitrust laws. 7
To resolve the problems created by the existing approach, courts
should assume a role of limited involvement 238 when examining the
existence of negotiations between the parties. Thus, once courts find
that an exchange or trade-off has occurred, they should stop inquiry."
So long as a collective bargaining relationship exists between the
parties, the third prong has been satisfied.24 It is not necessary that
232. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 218-29 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 158-79 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 30-44 and accompanying text.
238. J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 580. See text accompanying
supra notes 158-60.
239. This proposed modification in the courts' analysis means that the
nonstatutory labor exemption would be operative and that the eligibility rule would
be accorded immunity from antitrust attack: the rule constitutes a mandatory subject
(see supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text); it does not affect outsiders (see supra
notes 134-38 and accompanying text); and a collective bargaining relationship exists
between the parties. [see Collective bargaining Agreement Between National Football
League Management Council and the National Football League Players Association
(1977)].
240. The basic thesis of this view is that activities ought to be exempt from
the antitrust laws if: 1) the subject matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining; 2)
agreement on the matter would have its primary effects within the bargaining unit
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the restraint be the subject of a quid pro quo.211
This approach permits courts to effectuate the function of the
exemption and to likewise observe the policies of labor and antitrust
laws. Although the existing or potential employee who challenges the
player restraint may not obtain satisfaction through the antitrust laws,
he still has a viable means of redress through future collective bargain-
ing and labor law mechanisms.' Furthermore, this approach recognizes
that even though collective bargaining in the football industry is not
the mature institution it is in other industries, professional football
has employed the institution for nearly fifteen years.' Because during
that time the parties invoked the rights available to them under the
labor laws,2" the parties should be bound to the normal principles
of labor law.2 5
The proposed modification in the application of the exemption's
third prong will permit the courts to accurately ascertain restraints
which do not impact commercial competition 6 and to grant them anti-
trust immunity under the labor exemption. Nonetheless, a few ad-
justments in the substantive antitrust analysis are still necessary for
future restraints which may genuinely warrant the scrutiny of the
antitrust laws. These alterations do not require that the courts adopt
new principles; they only oblige the courts to invoke and apply
established principles, and to abandon the existing practice of stating
involved in the negotiations; 3) a collective bargaining relationship exists between the
parties. This thesis maintains that certain employment terms receive the benefit of
the labor exemption whether or not they had been specifically subjected to bargain-
ing. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 710 (Goldberg, J. dissenting in part). See also J.
WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note 10, at 580. The authors propose the adoption of
a "sham exception," which would require courts to additionally determine if negotia-
tions lacked substance or if an activity was the product of union-employer collusion.
This note does not advocate the adoption of such an exception, because the exception
would require and allow courts to pursue discussions similar to those which have
heretofore been defective and contrary to established principles. See, e.g., text accom-
panying supra notes 136-39.
241. quid pro quo is defined as "what for what; something for something."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (5th ed. 1979). See J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, supra note
10, at 580. But see Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-23.
242. See, e.g., supra note 166. See also Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623 (court encouraged
parties to solve their problems at the bargaining table).
243. See supra note 146.
244. For a survey of the use of strikes, lockouts, and grievance-arbitration pro-
cedures which the parties have invoked, see J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL. supra note
10, at 823-36.
245. Jocobs and Winter, supra note 72, at 12-13. The authors suggest that in
focusing upon group boycott and merger theories, both the litigants and courts have
overlooked the dispositive consideration of national labor policy.
246. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
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and subsequently ignoring the principles.24'7 First, the courts should
apply the principle that the joint venture nature of the NFL renders
application of a classic boycott theory to the league inappropriate.2 '
Second, the courts must give effect to the previous realization that
the specialized economic framework of the NFL necessitates Rule of
Reason analysis 49 and the Rule's corresponding advantage of a flexi-
ble inquiry into the purported justifications for a restraint.2" Finally,
when ultimately scrutinizing a restraint under Rule of Reason analysis,
the courts should give substantial consideration to the facts peculiar
to the football industry, the history of the particular activity, and the
purpose of the activity. 5' While courts have acknowledged the
authority to make these inquiries,211 they have not pursued the
authority in a way that indicates that the specialized nature of the
industry had indeed been given actual and substantial consideration.2"
The courts must take advantage of the inherent flexibility of Rule
of Reason analysis. The principles of the rule and the special nature
of the football industry mandate it.2"
CONCLUSION
Antitrust law promotes and protects free and unfettered com-
petition in the product market. In the traditional business market,
this goal is both desirable and workable. However, in the context of
the football industry, application of this policy to NFL player restraint
mechanisms ultimately produces distorted results.
The reason for these inconsistent outcomes is the critical dif-
ference between the factual situations that arise in the two industries.
247. See, e.g., Smith, 593 F.2d 1173; Mackey, 543 F.2d 606.
248. In discussing such an application to the draft system practiced within the
NFL, Judge MacKinnon noted: "to argue about the fine details of a draft ... in order
to comply with a hornbook interpretation of a law that was never intended to apply
to sports is pure folly." Smith, 593 F.2d at 1203-05 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Note that application of the group boycott theory may, however,
be appropriate when a restraint encompasses both the NFL and the USFL; the two
leagues, arguably, are competitors. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 30.
252. See, e.g., Smith, 593 F.2d at 1175; Mackey, 543 F.2d at 618-20.
253. See, e.g., Smith, 593 F.2d at 1175, 1203 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part, recognized the irony in the majority's holding that the draft
constituted a restraint of trade. He maintained that in light of the special nature of
the industry, the suppression of competition in that manner was essential in providing
the fans with an entertaining product).
254. This would not violate established principles. See supra note 35.
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In the traditional business context, the primary dispute involves the
effect of a union-management agreement on the product market.
Because antitrust law is primarily concerned with effects on the pro-
duct market, an activity which produces such an impact warrants anti-
trust scrutiny. In the football industry, the disputes entail the effect
of a union-management agreement in the labor market. Since the im-
pact is not on the product market, antitrust policy is not applicable.
To distinguish between the two types of effects, and thus determine
the appropriateness of antitrust scrutiny, the Supreme Court
developed the nonstatutory labor exemption.
The problems which later arise in the course of antitrust litiga-
tion in football originate in the courts' application of the third prong
of nonstatutory labor exemption analysis. The courts' inquiry into the
negotiations between the parties enables them to deny antitrust im-
munity to football's blatant labor market restraints. Consequently,
labor market restraints undergo substantive antitrust scrutiny in
direct contravention of antitrust law's primary concern for product
market restraints. Such scrutiny inevitably arouses the direct con-
frontation of labor and antitrust law. The ramifications of this con-
frontation are effectively reflected in the specific policy of each body
of law: antitrust law promotes competition in the relevant market
while labor law discourages competition in the relevant market. Hence,
to prevent the interplay of these polar sets of laws, courts must elicit
the proper functioning of the nonstatutory labor exemption by invoking
a deferential approach to their examination of the parties' negotiations.
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